Biopolytics and Bioeconomics in health: the paradigm of risk in informed consent and defensive medicine by Vergari, Ughetta
 
JDREAM. Journal of interDisciplinary REsearch Applied to Medicine  
JDREAM (2019),  v. 2 i. 2, 53-59  
ISSN 2532-7518 
DOI 10.1285/i25327518v2i2p53 
                                                                                       http://siba-ese.unisalento.it, © 2018 Università del Salento 
 
53 





 Department of History, Society and Human Studies, University of Salento, Italy 
 
      





At the beginning, it was the French philosopher Michel Foucault who explicitly defined medicine as a matter of 
biopolitics, making evident the role that, in his opinion, medical knowledge assumed in certain strategies of pow-
er. Starting from this assumption, the bioeconomic paradigm has been embodied in a form of governmentality of 
human behaviors, where the individuals are first and foremost considered biological living units. The biopolitical 
and bio-economic paradigm must not be considered as a space of absence of power, but a place where power 
leads to obedience by activating alternative devices, acting on population wishes and needs. These dynamics have 
slowly modified and even subverted the relationship between doctor and patient, determining the default of the 
paternalistic relationship and the strengthening of defensive medicine. 
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Biopolitics and bioeconomy  
 
The French philosopher Michel Foucault, in 
the second half of the last century, proposed a 
fructuous reflection focused on the concepts of 
biopower and biopolitics, whose interpretation, 
however, is not univocal; it is useful, therefore, 
to consider, in the first instance, some mean-
ings that the terms "biopower" and 
"biopolitics" assume in the huge production of 
the author. 
In 1974, Foucault spoke for the first time about 
the concept of biopolitics during the confer-
ence held in Rio de Janeiro about " The birth of 
social medicine". On this occasion two funda-
mental data emerge: the first, concerning the 
connection between biopolitics and capitalism, 
able to determine the possibility of implement-
ing a control on individuals, not only by con-
sciousness and ideology, but also through the 
body. 
The second, because of the first, is the im-
portance that the body assumes as a biopolitical 
reality and medicine as a biopolitical strategy 
(Foucault, 1997, 222). 
The real focus of Foucaultian researches, how-
ever, is not the living body, but rather its consti-
tution as a scientific object, as the specific 
knowledge indispensable for the exercise of a 
certain power. For this reason, Foucault's atten-
tion is often turned to all the published and in-
edited scientific speeches on the body.  
The initial reference of biopolitics to the body 
and medicine changes and expands a couple of 
years later, when he explains how the life power 
has developed in two directions, one focused 
on the body-machine, the other on the body-
species. In the first case, it is an anatomical-
political of the human body. It is materialized 
through processes of discipline and supported 
by mechanisms of power, both focused on the 
body to strengthen it, but also to make it "doc-
ile" and to incorporate it into effective and eco-
nomical control systems. 
In the second case, Foucault speaks specifically 
of biopolitics of the population, as the set of 
interventions and regulatory controls that, since 
the mid XVIII century, have addressed the set 
of living bodies constituting the population. Al-
so, in this perspective, the binomial constituted 
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by knowledge and power assumes a fundamen-
tal role. The affirmation of specific fields of 
knowledge, which not only include medical 
knowledge, but also demography, statistics and 
political economy, determines the possibility of 
managing the dynamics concerning health, hy-
giene, food, sexuality and all the biological pro-
cesses shared by living beings, as birth, prolifer-
ation, mortality, etc. 
Foucault precise that until the XVIII century, 
such management of the bodies were per-
formed according to the directions mentioned 
above in a distinct way. Together they inaugu-
rated bio-power era, which the author considers 
as an essential element for the development of 
capitalism, because of the controlled introduc-
tion of the bodies in the production chain and 
the adaptation of population phenomena to 
economic processes (Foucault, 1978, 123-124). 
The State has therefore adopted an economic 
rationality, determining the state transposition 
of “oikonomia” (the administration of the 
house), making it as a specific mode of inter-
vention in the public sphere (Esposito, 2015, 
19-20). 
Biopower, moreover, has shifted attention to 
the concept of norm, which has also begun to 
make its way in the legal context. Although it 
does not replace the law (i.e. the legal norm 
connected to power in the classical sense), it 
has undoubtedly led the law to function as a 
norm. It can be deduced from the fact that the 
juridical institution has increasingly integrated 
itself with other apparatuses, having medical 
and administrative regulatory functions. Unlike 
the law, which differentiates individuals based 
on what they do, playing on the contraposition 
between lawful and unlawful and, consequently, 
prohibiting or condemning, the norm usually 
identifies and differentiates both individuals 
and populations based on what they are, focus-
ing on the normal-pathological duality. 
What is outlined is, finally, a new technology of 
power, which Foucault sees fully realized in the 
framework of the so-called liberal 
"governmentality". Because of the mentioned 
concepts, it appears not attributable to the sim-
ple juridical analysis of sovereignty. Moreover, 
biopower requires the contribution of the eco-
nomic dimension. The object of this 
governmentality is the sum of singular and col-
lective living beings, anatomical bodies and bio-
logical bodies. The political rationality is in 
some measure forced to treat “omnes et 
singulatim”, producing at the same time indi-
vidualizing and totalizing effects (Foucault, 
2001, 145-146). 
 
Normalization and medicalization 
 
In the medical field, the governmental pro-
cess called "medicalization of society", charac-
terized by "a generalized medical conscience", 
was implemented by the task of controlling ei-
ther individual life, through the identification 
and treatment of diseases, or collective life, in 
order to define and implement specific health 
parameters. (Sorrentino, 2008, 108). In this 
context also hygiene represents, besides medi-
cine, a specific field of knowledge within a 
structured regime of health of the populations. 
It was based on the analysis of the habitats (cit-
ies, districts and houses) and on the rates of 
morbidity and mortality of the inhabitants, jus-
tifying authoritarian medical interventions in all 
those places at risk for possible diseases and ep-
idemics (Foucault, 1997, 195-196). 
The importance of medicine, not only 
methodologically but also ontologically, in the 
constitution of human sciences has thus 
emerged. It was the possibility for the individu-
al to be, at the same time, subject and object of 
his own knowledge (Foucault, 2005, XVII). 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, 
however, the role of medicine connected to the 
problem of health, undoubtedly fundamental, 
was seen from an essentially nationalist per-
spective. It was particularly aimed at ensuring 
health, to preserve the national physical force, 
the workforce, production capacity and military 
strength. 
For this reason, Foucault considered 1942 a 
date with a strong symbolic value. In that year 
the Beveridge plan was drawn up, showing, un-
like what had happened in the past, that the 
phenomenon of the consolidation of medicine 
was connected for the first time to a right to 
health. In addition, even though it was made 
explicit in a world context in which paradoxical-
ly millions of human lives were suppressed, the 
Beveridge plan appeared essential for the or-
ganization of health after the end of World War 
II. It consolidated not only the right to life, but 
Ughetta Vergari 
55 
a different right, more important and complex, 
represented by the right to health. 
With the Beveridge Plan, the State takes on 
the social task of taking charge of the health of 
the members of society, with a profoundly dif-
ferent meaning from what had happened up to 
then. This is a reversal point of view, because 
the health concern does not longer apply to the 
State itself and its priorities, but rather individu-
als. No longer the healthy individual at the ser-
vice of the State, but the State at the service of 
the healthy individual. Foucault specifies how a 
kind of body morality has been defined, which, 
in the 19th century, had focused on cleaning 
and hygiene practices as a guarantee of good 
health. On the contrary, starting from the 20th 
century, it even goes so far as to support the 
right to suspend work because of illness. Health 
and illness thus became a budget item of the 
State, falling within the government macroeco-
nomic sphere. The Beveridge plan ultimately 
outlines the idea that the risks, connected with 
health and the possible interruption of work, no 
longer concern individuals but the State, which 
must therefore bear them (148-149). It is pre-
cisely on the basis of this approach that the aim 
of politics takes the name of welfare, because 
the state of well-being is guaranteed to citizens, 
who commit themselves to the contractual 
conditions of a pact, where the sacrifice of 
work is exchanged for insurance guarantees on 
health and old age. In this perspective, the 
management of the economic crisis by the capi-
talist economy assumes the connotations of a 
policy of salvation and of almost religious ma-
trix. It is also highlighted by the etymology of 
the terms "healthy" and "safe", which, within 
the social reforms of the second post-war peri-
od, highlight the overlap between the religious 
value of salvation and the biological value of 
health (Esposito, 2015, 67). 
 
Crisis of modern medicine: a game of rela-
tional asymmetries 
 
For Foucault, from the time of Constantine, 
many governments, including European ones 
up to the 18th century, have distinguished 
themselves for their theocratic role, character-
ized by pursuing the salvation of souls as their 
main objective; this role, however, has finally 
given way to a somatocracy, in which the main 
objective of State intervention is the care of the 
body, physical health, the relationship between 
health and disease (Foucault, 1997, 205). 
What Foucault reflects further on, however, is 
the crisis that is evident in current medicine, at-
tributable to the distance that would exist be-
tween scientific and effectiveness of medicine. 
In short, the possible negative effects of medi-
cine, including the risk of death, have been rep-
resented as a partial consequence of the igno-
rance of the doctor or of medicine itself, so, the 
harmfulness was proportional to its non-
scientific nature. At the beginning of the 20th 
century, however, the harmfulness of medicine 
was linked to its knowledge, to its being a sci-
ence (206). 
The crisis of medicine has been even more 
marked by the changes in the relationship be-
tween doctor and patient, a relationship from 
the remote past, starting from to the Hippo-
cratic Oath, despite the Hippocratic principles 
are very current. Beyond the specific principles 
and contents, however, the Hippocratic Oath 
highlights the strong relational character, aimed 
at guaranteeing unconditional respect for the 
person at the weakest end of the care relation-
ship. Moreover, the Hippocratic care relation-
ship is strongly characterized by an asymmet-
rical distribution of resources between the per-
son receiving the care and the person providing 
it, with the former totally subject to the latter. 
This asymmetry, inherent in the technical con-
tents of the treatment, producing a radical dis-
tance between those who administer the treat-
ment and those who receive it, is not, however, 
an asymmetry that hinders relationality. In fact, 
it does not lead to prevaricating outcomes, 
while it should lead to concrete positive solu-
tions, as the result of a real cooperative spirit. 
(Ruggeri, 2010, 17).  
The relational asymmetry that emerges from 
the doctor-patient relationship is a constant el-
ement of any power relationship, as highlighted 
also in the foucaultian genealogical reconstruc-
tion. If this asymmetry, in the context of sover-
eignty, was clearly structured between the sov-
ereign and his subjects, nevertheless it remains 
in the biopolitical perspective. Life, even 
though it is no longer subject to that power of 
life and death that acts by taking it, is managed 
because of relationships within a fundamental 
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asymmetry between those who hold the truth 
and knowledge, and those who are subject to it. 
Obviously, even the doctor-patient relationship 
is not exempt from this mechanism. The medi-
calization of society itself has been possible by 
subjects possessing medical knowledge and 
considered authoritative. They were able to in-
duce certain behaviors and manage certain dy-
namics into the society. However, the doctor-
patient relationship, sometimes defined as pa-
ternalistic, provided that the doctor had the 
power to treat but, at the same time, to choose 
the therapy considered most suitable for the 
case in question. The only limit to this power 
was the fact that the choice had to be made in 
science and conscience, with the patient's will 
practically nil (Grassini and Pacifico 2012, 14). 
It was only later that the so-called informed 
consent had on a crucial role. It finds its begin-
ning during medical experimentations, con-
ducted at the beginning of the 20th century. It 
acquired its greatest fame in the Nuremberg 
process, from which arose in 1946 the Nurem-
berg Code, which states the principle that "the 
voluntary consent of the human being is essen-
tial". 
It is however important to underline that this 
Code was developed as a response to the abus-
es carried out in the extermination camps dur-
ing the Second World War, highlighting how 
experimentation was not a strictly therapeutic 
activity, but that it had the potential to cause 
physical and psychophysical injuries to individ-
uals. 
A different case was in the traditional medical 
practice, which was not prosecuted in Nurem-
berg, where the activity of the doctor, aimed at 
identifying and treating a certain disease follow-
ing a more or less safe therapy, was justified on 
the basis of a state of need, real or supposed 
(13). It is only in the last decades that the prin-
ciple of informed consent has firmly established 
in the relationship between doctor and patient, 
ratifying the end of the paternalistic relationship 
and the advent of the autonomy of the patient. 
It was also expressed by the National Commit-
tee for Bioethics in its 1992 Opinion "Infor-
mation and consent to the medical act", which 
also revealed the close link between the consent 
that the patient must give and the information 
that is provided to him. 
The philosopher and sociologist Jürgen 
Habermas, referring to the Freudian analysis of 
the therapeutic dialogue between doctor and 
patient, has taken up the peculiarity of the 
asymmetrical relationship in the distribution of 
roles, linking it to the potential of communica-
tive action. In this perspective, he defines 
"therapeutic criticism" a form of argument that 
can solve cases of self-deception, to which the 
patient is often victim (Habermas 1997, 78). 
This is evident in the relationship between the 
psychotherapist and the patient, where the lat-
ter is induced to reflect on himself and on his 
own situation. Thus, the behavior of a subject 
appears rational when he can rid himself of his 
own illusions, that are not the result of an error, 
but rather of a form of self-deception. For this 
purpose, it is essential that the patient first ac-
quires an opening towards those who can shed 
light on what, at least initially, appears to be a 
form of irrationality. A rational attitude presup-
poses a willingness to understand and, if there 
are communication disorders, also a reflection 
on linguistic rules. 
This reflection can be extended to any profes-
sional doctor-patient relationship and to all 
those situations in which the difference be-
tween the patient's self-deception and the phy-
sician's knowledge is most evident. The concept 
of communicative action becomes crucial. It is 
realized every time that an interpersonal rela-
tionship is established between at least two sub-
jects capable of action and language (with ver-
bal or extra-verbal forms). The main aim is to 
reach an understanding that leads to a common 
agreement on the action plans to pursue. Lan-
guage, in this process, is fundamental because 
the level of interpretation of specific situations 
susceptible to consensus depends on it (157). 
The communication process has clearly become 
indispensable in order to proceed to any medi-
cal act, as also underlined by the Code of Medi-
cal Deontology in art. 33, which highlights the 
duty of the doctor to provide the patient with 
detailed information on the diagnosis and pro-







From informed consent to defensive medi-
cine 
 
The singular and in some ways surprising fact, 
therefore, emerges from the history of the doc-
tor-patient relationship, especially with refer-
ence to the historical period that began in the 
twentieth century. In such period, medicine ac-
quired a great therapeutic security, attributing to 
doctors, for the first time in history, the power 
to effectively treat common diseases. Paradoxi-
cally, at this very juncture, the doctor-patient 
relationship cracked, risking compromising the 
prestige that doctors had enjoyed until then. 
Prestige and medical authority, moreover, 
played a fundamental symbolical role as indica-
tors of the ability and power of a doctor to 
transmit confidence during his work and in the 
possibility of recovery to the patient. 
Foucault, reflecting on the possibilities that sci-
ence and medicine offered to populations, es-
pecially since the second half of the last centu-
ry, highlighted how the current medical tools 
have different effects on population. Although 
they are not generally considered harmful, tools 
can nevertheless be incontrollable, forcing the 
human species to enter a dangerous history, in-
to a field of probability and risks the extent of 
which cannot be precisely measured. The phi-
losopher from Poitiers emphasized that, alt-
hough the medical risk, that is the difficult con-
nection to break between positive and negative 
effects of medicine, is not a novelty, today this 
risk has entered a new dimension. It is no long-
er imputable only to the treated subject or to its 
descendants, but to the entire human species. 
The possibility of medical and genetic interven-
tions on DNA has placed life in its entirety (no 
longer the life of an individual or a specific 
population) in the field of medical impacts, 
marking the entrance into what Foucault de-
fines as bio-history. In this dimension, human 
history can modify life and can exert fundamen-
tal effects on its process. This can determine 
one of the main risks of current medicine, the 
problems of communication from doctors to 
patients (and “vice-versa”), in addition to the 
technical anxiety that doctors and biologists feel 
about their practice and their knowledge. 
Apart from the crisis resulting from these dy-
namics, Foucault believed that there is also the 
phenomenon of indefinite medicalization, 
which has led medicine to act outside its tradi-
tional field, going beyond the encounter with 
the patient and the disease. Medicine is increas-
ingly proposed as an act of authority, regardless 
of the patient's demand (for example, screening 
policies or the role that doctors and psychia-
trists play both in the workplace and in the ju-
diciary). Finally, the subject of medical interven-
tion is no longer exclusively illness, but health 
in the broadest sense. Thus, all medical inter-
ventions, that in general are aimed to improve 
the health conditions of individuals, respect the 
principle that the preponderance given to the 
disease has become a form of general regulation 
of society. 
Lastly, Foucault considered among the charac-
teristics of modern medicine what he defines as 
the "political economy of medicine". It would 
not be a novelty, meaning that from the begin-
ning it was precisely the economic problems 
that determined the medical organization. 
However, while in the past medicine was as-
sumed as an instrument of conservation and 
renewal of the workforce for the functioning of 
modern society, today it directly produces wel-
fare to the extent that health represents a desire 
for one and a luxury for the others. Health has 
effectively become an object of consumption 
and has become a market product. As a result, 
the body has also entered the market twice, 
once by wages, when it has sold its workforce, 
and once by health, where the body comes to 
be an object of sensations and desires. Incite-
ment to prevention, empowerment and optimi-
zation (different screenings, healthy eating reg-
imens, not smoking, improving own individual 
performance, etc.) cannot, however, be ad-
dressed to everyone. This inevitably is the price 
to be paid, taking the form of exclusive and ex-
clusionary medicalization (Bazzicalupo 2006, 
111-113). 
In addition, rapid technological and scientific 
progress has also led to the reduced perception 
of death as a possible outcome of the disease, 
but rather as an avoidable complication. This 
led to paradoxically believe that, in the event of 
an unfortunate outcome, it is the doctor who 
handled the clinical case who has committed a 
mistake and must pay. 
Inevitably, there has been a fracture of the doc-
tor-patient relationship, to which many factors 
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have contributed, including the progressive bu-
reaucratization of medical services, the process 
of technocratic and political transformation of 
the health organization, the increasing costs of 
care. These factors determine the consequent 
recourse to the assessment of health costs and 
benefits for patients, and finally the progressive 
abandonment of the physical approach to the 
patient, replaced by clinical investigation and by 
the growing use of technological tools. 
Moreover, the increasingly predominant role of 
the economy and the costs in the current health 
has become more evident, transforming hospi-
tals into "Health Authorities", in which the 
health of citizens is a product or rather a com-
modity, correlated with the payment and/or the 
refund by the state for hospital services. Con-
sequently, even ethical values are continuously 
questioned and often subordinated to economic 
interests. 
These changes have led, especially in recent 
times, to a growing level of complaints related 
to so-called "malpractice" cases. Claims arising 
either from patients’ greater awareness of health 
care, or from a considerable increase of eco-
nomic compensations established in court-
rooms, led to a greater readiness by the public 
to appeal to jurisprudence for medical ligations. 
The increase in awareness of the right to health 
when receiving treatment and in expectations 
of public health facilities has perhaps reached 
excessive and often unjustified levels. So that 
medical treatment, which does not produce the 
desired clinical outcome, is often interpreted by 
the patient as a mistake, whereas it can simply 
be scientifically impossible. 
Currently, an increasing number of patients use 
internet to search for diagnoses and treatments 
(the “e-doctor” phenomenon) going after that 
to the family doctor or a specialist to confirm 
their results. By these dangerous behaviors, 
many potential patients consider internet as a 
substitute for the family doctor.  
The most obvious consequence of this situation 
is that doctors are increasingly relying on defen-
sive medicine, allowing their diagnostic and 
therapeutic strategies to be conditioned by "ju-
dicial caution" rather than by their scientific be-
liefs. This has a serious economic impact, re-
sulting from the excessive provision of care and 
unnecessary recourse to tests and clinical exam-
inations.  
In addition to the doctor's fear to be dragged in 
a court by patients, another reason for defen-
sive medicine increasing phenomenon is the 
poor organization of complex health structures, 
in which the reference protocols do not ade-
quately specify roles and responsibilities. 
The burden of each judicial case therefore falls 
on the individual doctor, who is the last link in 
the chain of organization of the health system. 
Consequently, doctors daily face with bigger 
problems than themselves and resort to defen-
sive medicine, which is just an attempt to share 
the burden of responsibility with others. 
Another consequence of the increase in claims 
on malpractice is the growing cost of insurance 
premiums, so much so that recent political pro-
posals on medical claims go in the direction of 
translating in the civil right rather than criminal 
process. This would lead to an increase in in-
surance premiums, the cost of which would not 
be charged to the individual doctors but to the 
health facility in which they operate. These in-
surance policies would encourage risk manage-
ment, adequately supported by the health ser-
vice, in order to reduce unfair practices and 
thus keep insurance premiums to a minimum.  
Risk management considers all the huge medi-
cal complex activities, undertaken to improve 
the quality of health care and ensure patient 
safety. Only a proper risk management can lead 
to substantial changes in clinical practice, mak-
ing it more suitable to the needs of both pa-
tients and healthcare professionals (Toraldo, 
Vergari and Toraldo 2015). 
Already in December 2001, the National Bio-
ethics Committee (NBC), in an opinion on 
"Purposes, Limits and Risks of Medicine", 
demonstrated that medical failures are often the 
most visible aspects of medical practice in the 
wider sectors of the population. They generate 
collective reactions expressed and amplified by 
the media, with legal consequences and de-
mands for individual damages. 
The solution to these problems lies first in edu-
cating the public of potential patients. The in-
volvement of society requires ethical communi-
cation addressed to all citizens, designed to in-
form them about the nature, possibilities, limits 
and risks of modern medicine, both in scientific 
than in practical terms. Adequate communica-
tions mean to provide transparent information 
and news, even when they are unpleasant or 
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disappointing. Only in a context of effective 
transparency is possible, according to NBC, to 
find solutions to legal and bioethical issues, 
concerning medical responsibility and of strong 
social relevance. 
It would be essential for all the media to con-
sider their aim to correctly inform citizens, also 
highlighting the differences that, in health 
terms, inevitably arise in the various geograph-
ical, technological and logistical contexts.
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